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Abstract 
 Already Aristotle spoke about different modi, or ways of being. Surprisingly enough, in 
the modern literature the discussion of this concept is very limited. This paper discusses 
Wittgenstein’s constructivist ontology of ways. Wittgenstein’s ways are different both from 
modi and from tropes. In short, his ontology of ways explores the manners in which the ele-
ments of one ontological system can be arranged so that ontological systems of higher order 
are produced. The advantage of this ontology is that it suggests an elegant solution to the 
problem of the emergence of systems of new order, such as matter, space, life, mind, and 
works of art. The concluding section presents examples of using this ontology as a model for 
treating “really hard problems” in the philosophy of biology, anthropology, and cosmology. 
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1. What are the Ways? 
 Aristotle explored different modes (qua) of being. Unfortunately, in modern literature, 
discussion on this concept has been largely neglected. A possible exception was Roman 
Ingarden, who investigated it in his Time and Modes of Being (1964). 
 Even more neglected is the concept of ways as a specific type of mode. Interest in this 
concept has increased only in recent years. Some authors explore it in connection with the 
ontological status of universals and particulars. For example, one claims that universals (for 
example, the shape of my house) are the different ways in which the building blocks (the par-
ticulars) of the object (my house) are ordered (Berman 2008, 220). The Trope Theory of 
Ways argues in a similar vein (Simons 1994).  
 Closer to our approach but developed in another direction is the discussion on constitu-
tional relation by Barker (2000) and Zangwill (2012). They consider constitutional relation as 
a primitive and unanalysed notion. It cannot be reduced to other, more fundamental relations. 
Unfortunately, these two authors fail to suggest a conception that convincingly explains the 
emergence of new ontological orders. 
 In this paper, we will discuss the ontology of ways that employs the concept of construc-
tion (constitution) as well as of modal entailment. It defends hierarchical organization of the 
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being with many levels of ontological dependence. To be more explicit, we will explore 
Wittgenstein’s conception of the ways of arranging a set of elements of one ontological level 
that produces a new ontological level. Its main advantage is that it sees the emergence of new 
entities like matter, space, life, mind, works of art, etc., as the construction of new ontological 
levels from the old ones.  
 To be sure, not every arrangement of the elements of one ontological level leads to the 
emergence of a new ontological order; it only takes place in specific cases. Moreover, most 
often, one cannot produce a new ontological level according to plan. However, the fact that 
we cannot predict the exact way of arranging individuals of one ontological level, which will 
produce a new ontological level, is not a valid argument against the constructivist ontology of 
ways. Scientific knowledge of human anatomy also fails to predict how life emerges from the 
analysed structure of the body. Nevertheless, it is a useful discipline that helps the most in our 
efforts to learn more about how our body functions.  
 Wittgenstein’s ontology of ways is not reductivist but deductivist, in the sense that he 
rejects the view that entities of higher ontological orders are reducible to entities of lower 
order. However, Wittgenstein supports the view that the former are deducible from the latter, 
with which they stay in contact. This happens because they are ontologically dependent. Fur-
thermore, Wittgenstein does not reject the emergence of higher ontological orders. He denies 
that the emergence is a product of an occult process, though (see § 6, (iv)). Moreover, Witt-
genstein explores how exactly the new ontological order comes into existence.  
 
2.  Frege, Husserl, and Russell 
 The early analytic philosophers, Frege, Russell, and Husserl were the first to intensively 
discuss the constructivist ontology of ways.
1
 Frege maintained that the sense of the sign is 
determined by the way (die Art) of its presenting (Frege 1892, 158). Though he did not ex-
plore the sense of the proposition in similar terms (as we will see in § 3, [ii], only Wittgen-
stein did this), we can construct it accordingly as the way in which the elements of the propo-
sition are combined. 
 Husserl held that different types of mental acts (noeses) are the specific ways (die Weise) 
in which the human mind (the ‘Ego’) is directed to its objects (noemata) (Mayer 2009, 70–1; 
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Husserl 1901, ii, 761). Since mental acts have a constitutive function in Husserl’s ontology, 
the objects of the external world are only given by the way in which they are grasped. 
 However, the first person to explicitly and most innovatively explore the concept of 
“way” in the constructivist sense was Bertrand Russell. In his paper “What is Logic?” Russell 
defined that discipline (logic) as the study of the forms of complexes. Russell further claimed 
that these forms are nothing but ‘the way the constituents of complexes are put together’ 
(1912, 55). The constituents of a proposition are united neither by their “organic unity” 
(Moore) nor by the “context principle” (Frege), but by the way in which they are ordered. 
 Russell had great hopes from the introduction of the concept of ways into his ontology. 
He believed that it could help eliminate superfluous entities, such as propositions and logical 
constants. Importantly enough, Russell’s programme was not reductive but merely elimina-
tive.
2
 As we will see shortly, it massively influenced Wittgenstein’s ontology of ways. 
 The aforementioned steps of elaborating the concept of way presented by Frege, Husserl, 
and Russell suggest that the interest in that concept was a product of extensive exploration of 
the problem of analysis. That such exploration can be fruitful by discussing the problems of 
non-reductive metaphysics is well known from the fact that G. E. Moore is today unanimous-
ly credited with the introduction of the concept of supervenience.
3
 The motivating intuition 
behind the present paper is that important ideas of the early analytic philosophers remained 
unexplored by the upcoming philosophical generations. Our objective here is to rationally 
reconstruct perhaps the most fruitful of them: Wittgenstein’s constructivist ontology of ways. 
 
3. The Early Wittgenstein: Six Ways 
 A full-fledged ontology of ways (Art und Weise) as a means of producing ontological 
stages of a different order was first elaborated in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. Like Russell, 
Wittgenstein hoped that with its help he could reach the most austere (the most parsimonious) 
ontology that eliminates much philosophical confusion. Regrettably, Wittgenstein’s ontology 
of ways remained largely overlooked. Also the newly awakened interest in the concept of 
ways among the ontologists (see § 1) did not change the situation. One reason for this was 
that Wittgenstein’s ontology of ways was only implicitly articulated. Moreover, as we will 
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 On the difference between reductionism and eliminativism by Russell, see Landini (2003) 
and Beaney (2016). 
3
 Cf. Moore (1922, 261). 
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see in § 4, this implicitness had its deep theoretical reasons. The task of this paper is to make 
it explicit and show how resourceful this ontology is. 
 Wittgenstein developed his Tractarian ontology of ways in (at least) six steps: 
(i) Constructing States of Affairs. In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein maintained that “in a 
state of affairs [in atomic facts], objects stand in a determinate relation [Art und Weise] to one 
another” (2.031). “They fit into one another like the links of a chain” (2.03). In other words, 
states of affairs are nothing but “the determinate way1 in which objects are connected in [it]” 
(2.032).  
 By this connection, we have a topologically tight “fitting” (passen) of the objects (of 
their boundaries) of the states of affairs of one and another, in a specific arrangement (in a 
specific way1). So, according to this conception, the elements (the objects) in the state of af-
fairs are not connected with the help of a third element (a mortar);
4
 they stick together 
through the topology of their boundaries alone.
5
 In other words, states of affairs are nothing 
but collections of invariant items (objects) ordered in a specific way1. Moreover, the new 
way1 in which they are tied together gives birth to the new ontological level: the states of 
affairs. 
 Apparently, exactly this kind of ontology urged Wittgenstein to introduce the concept of 
state of affairs in his logical philosophy. To be sure, the original German word for this term—
Sachverhalt—underlines that states of affairs are unities composed of objects, or things (Sa-
chen), which are interrelated (sich zueinander verhalten; cf. Mulligan 1985) in a certain way1. 
Moreover, the tight fitting of the boundaries of the elements (things) to one another and, as 
already noted, not some third element between them, is the cement (the glue) that ties these 
things together into a whole so that they are not merely loose complexes. Importantly enough, 
in contrast to Frege and G. E. Moore, Wittgenstein held that the unity of the states of affairs 
is not “organic” but achieved because of their topology alone.  
(ii) Constructing Propositions via Projecting States of Affairs. Wittgenstein’s next claim 
was that in the act of copying (modelling) states of affairs through propositions (pictures), the 
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 “The elements [of the state of affairs] are not connected with one another by anything.” 
(Wittgenstein 1930, 252) 
5
 The building blocks of the walls of many Inca constructions in Machu Picchu have similar 
topological forms of cohesion. These centuries-old buildings were built with stones having 
boundaries that exactly fitted one another. This fitting together is precisely what made them 
stay together in good order for centuries.  
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structure of states of affairs is articulated in a new, strictly determined way2: “What a propo-
sition expresses it expresses in a determinate manner [way2] which can be set out clearly” 
(3.251). Way2 is thus the new element that the act of modelling (articulating, projecting) 
states of affairs introduces. It can also be called the form of picturing (“pictorial form”), or of 
projecting, or simply the way2 in which the picture is articulated in time and space. 
 As it can be expected, the relation between the piece of reality (state of affairs) and its 
picture is a topological relation of the tight fitting of the elements of the two structures. By its 
correlation to the state of affairs, the picture “touches” the state of affairs with its “feelers” 
(2.1515). In fact, only the “end-points [of the feelers …] actually touch” the state of affairs 
(2.15121). Here again, the touch occurs without the help of a third element.  
 The “hinge” that connects the two elements—state of affairs and its picture—is their 
“logical multiplicity”. It is “what a picture must have in common with reality, in order to be 
able to depict it—correctly or incorrectly—in the way[2] it does” (2.17). 
Apparently, Wittgenstein held that the shared multiplicity (the hinge) between the two 
structures—picture and state of affairs—(ontologically) depends on the way1 in which the 
two are composed. Indeed, he maintained that “what constitutes a picture [what makes a pic-
ture picture] is that its elements are related to one another in a determinate way[1]” (2.14). To 
be more exact, the picture takes shape because “the things are related to one another in the 
same way[1] as the elements of the picture” (2.151).  
Similar is the construction of the propositional sign, or of “the [sensibly] perceptible sign 
of a proposition” (3.11): “What constitutes a propositional sign is that in it its elements (the 
words) stand in a determinate relation to one another” (3.14)—in a way1. The way1 in which 
the elements of the propositional sign are connected shows “how [the way1] things stand” 
(4.022, 4.5) in the state of affairs.   
 Among other things, this conception shows that way2 is ontologically dependent on 
way1.
6
 To be more exact, a proposition can project a state of affairs in a certain way2 so that it 
can model the state of affairs only because the way1 in which the elements of the picture are 
ordered is the same as the way1 in which the elements of the state of affairs are built. In fact, 
exactly the identity of the way1 of arranging the elements of both the state of affairs and its 
picture fixes their shared multiplicity. 
That way2 ontologically depends on way1 betrays an implicit principle of the Tractatus 
that deserves attention. This principle maintains that there is a hierarchy of ontological de-
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pendencies of ways. As we will see in the lines to come, however, the sequence of these onto-
logical dependencies has more of a character of fractals than of a Porphyrian tree. Indeed, the 
relation between way3 and way2 is not the same as that between way2 and way1, and even more 
so the relation between way4 and way3, etc.  
(iii) Constructing Thoughts (Application of Propositional Signs). The formed pic-
tures/propositions, resp. propositional signs can be applied. To be more exact, “a positional 
sign, applied and thought out, is a thought” (3.5). It goes without saying that the hinge be-
tween the propositional sign and its application—the thought—is their identical logical mul-
tiplicity.  
This is Wittgenstein’s answer to the question: What is thought? Thought is not an occult 
process
7—it is not a process at all8—but an element (a state of affairs) of reality, (logically) 
projected (transformed) in specific way2 by the propositional sign that is applied (trans-
formed) in a specific way3. In a sense, thought is the reverse side of picturing states of affairs, 
or of the way2 of their articulation. This, however, does not mean that way3 is reducible to 
way2; it is only ontologically dependent on it. This indicates that entities constructed by 
ways3 are deducible from entities constructed by ways2.  
(iv) Truth. Truth and falsity are two different ways4 of relating propositions to states of 
affairs: “ ‘p’ signified in the true way[4] what ‘~p’ signified in the false way[4]” (4.061). It 
follows that Frege’s conception of truth and falsity of propositions as objects is false. They 
are only forms (ways2) of relatedness of propositions to states of affairs. 
(v) Propositions of Logic (Tautologies). An important point in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus 
is that human beings copy states of affairs spontaneously, without following acts of their will. 
It is true of thinking, too. We do not think because we decide to do so. Speaking and thinking 
are simply parts of human natural history. Alternatively, as Wittgenstein put it, “man pos-
sesses the ability to construct languages capable of expressing every sense [and to think about 
every sense], without having any idea how each word has meaning or what its meaning is” 
(4.002). 
The situation is quite different in logic. Indeed, one constructs propositions of logic (tau-
tologies) on purpose. Moreover, in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, tautologies are something of an 
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 Wittgenstein further developed this claim in his Philosophical Investigations. Cf. § 6 (iv) 
below. 
8
 This position results from Wittgenstein’s non-emergentist stance. 
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optical instrument that helps us to see—it shows9—the form of propositions of science and 
ordinary language: “The propositions of logic demonstrate the logical properties of proposi-
tions by combining them to form propositions that say nothing” (6.121). Exactly this “com-
bining” shows the way5 the logical properties of the propositions are hooked to each other in 
the logical knot they build in order to form their sense. Wittgenstein also called this kind of 
showing a method; in fact, the whole of mathematics is nothing but a logical method that em-
ploys equations. 
The use of the term “method” here is no accident. Often, when Wittgenstein spoke about 
active operation with symbols, he used the term “method” instead of “way”. As we will see in 
§ 5, the later Wittgenstein frequently spoke about method—about the method of verification, 
for example—instead of way. Without any doubt, this growing use of the term “method” is 
connected with the increased role of action in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. Ontologically, 
however, the two terms mean the same. 
(vi) Contemplation beyond Time. Works of art and the good life are also products of see-
ing elements of reality in a specific way6: in the way6a we see a single object (the works of 
art) sub specie aeternitatis, or in the way6b we see the whole world (the good life) sub specie 
aeternitatis (1961, 83). The same is also true of the mystical way6c of contemplating the 
world. It makes it possible “to view [to feel] the world sub specie aeterni…as a limited 
whole” (6.45). 
 
4. Concluding Remarks on Wittgenstein’s Tractarian Ways 
 We have seen that there are at least six different “ways” in Wittgenstein’s Tractarian 
constructivist ontology. By way of taking stock of our study so far, we would like to say that 
the Tractatus introduced a full-fledged ontology of ways that helps one to construct entities 
of at least the following ontological levels: states of affairs, propositions, propositional signs, 
thoughts, tautologies, truths/falsehoods, works of art/the good life/the mystical. For obvious 
reasons, however, this paper will not analyse them in detail. Our objective here is more hum-
ble. It is to present in brief Wittgenstein’s concept of ways and, at the end of the paper, to 
reveal their explanatory power in naturalistic metaphysics.  
We have already seen (in § 3, [v]) that the tautologies of logic and mathematics show the 
logical form of the propositions of science and ordinary language. Wittgenstein insisted that 
“a proposition shows its sense. A proposition shows [the way2] how things stand [wie es sich 
                                            
9
 We will say more about Wittgenstein’s concept of showing in § 4. 
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verhält]” (4.022). This point betrays that Wittgenstein’s ontological ways are ineffable. We 
can only notice them and point at them; we can grasp them or show them. But we cannot de-
fine them, or theoretically analyse them. We can only conceive of them intuitively. Among 
other things, this point (at least partly) explains why theoreticians and historians of analytic 
philosophy badly overlooked Wittgenstein’s many concepts of way.  
 We would also like to emphasize that Wittgenstein’s Tractarian ontology of ways re-
mained essentially the ontology of one world.
10
 It thus opposed the ontology of many subor-
dinated worlds of his teachers, Frege (the author of the conception of three worlds) and Rus-
sell (the author of the Ramified Theory of Types).
11
  
 Moreover, Wittgenstein’s Tractarian ontology was not emergentist. The transition from 
one ontological level to a higher one does not mean a transition from one world to a higher 
one. Wittgenstein’s ontological levels are only different stages of one and the same world. In 
a sense, Wittgenstein’s Tractarian ways are simply “bridges” to new, higher ontological lev-
els.  
 Perhaps this is the main advantage of Wittgenstein’s constructivist ontology of ways: It 
dispenses with the accepting of many ontologically subordinate worlds. At the same time, the 
Tractarian ontology of ways is not reductionist. The level of propositions and of propositional 
signs, for example, is not reducible to their elements. Without the specific way in which the 
elements are ordered, the proposition/propositional sign would not come into existence.  
 Yet another point is that Wittgenstein’s different concepts of ways (ways1–6) form a 
family with the members bearing close resemblance to each other. They, however, have no 
“general form” and no general structure. This point is especially well demonstrated by the 
fact that the relation between different ways is divergent. Indeed, whereas way2 is ontologi-
cally dependent on way1, way6, for example, is not based on way5 (cf. § 3, [ii]).   
 
5. The Later Wittgenstein: Four Further Ways 
 As it is well known today, the focus of Wittgenstein’s attention changed in the early 
1930s. While the Tractatus was mainly concerned with the acts of modelling (articulating) 
parts of the world (states of affairs) through language (propositions) and thoughts, at the be-
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 Incidentally, the very term “hinge” betrays that we have here not two worlds but two 
planes of one and the same world. 
11
 At the same time, Wittgenstein’s Tractatus can be also seen to maintain the existence of 
many possible worlds (cf. Bradley 1992)—without hierarchy between them, though.  
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ginning of the 1930s, Wittgenstein deepened the exploration of the relation between the ac-
tion of language-speaking and the action of language-learning (between the actions of 
demonstrating how to compute and of learning how to compute). In this connection, he also 
critically discussed the concept of rule—the supposed principle that apparently guides us 
when we use a language or when we calculate. The whole of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy 
can be advantageously seen from this perspective.  
 Importantly enough, with the change in his conception, starting with his “Theses” 
(1930), Wittgenstein gradually abandoned the term of “ways” and spoke more often about 
“method” and “use”.12 However, the concept he employed remained the same. From this 
change in Wittgenstein’s position, four further types of ways emerged in his ontology: 
(vii) Propositions’ Meaning. Around 1930, Wittgenstein started claiming that “the mean-
ing of a proposition is the way[7] it is verified” (1930, 244). In other words, it is the way7 in 
which we can apply it—or linguistically act with it. In his later work, this thesis was explicat-
ed in the doctrine that “the meaning of a word is its use in the language” (1953, § 43). The 
use here means nothing but the way7 in which the word is applied, or in which we can lin-
guistically act with its help.  
(viii) Language/Calculating Learning. The change in the theoretical interest of the later 
Wittgenstein urged him to put at the centre of his attention the problem of language/calculus 
learning. He held that two persons, teacher and student, teach/learn a language sentence by 
sentence, by which one action (the speaking of the sentence by the pupil) models another 
action (the demonstration of the sentence-command by the teacher). To be more exact, the 
pupil is “drilled” (abgerichtet) for this purpose. The same is also true about teaching and 
learning how to calculate. 
Importantly enough, this kind of action-modelling proceeds in a form similar to that in 
which pictures model states of affairs in the Tractatus. The hinge between the two levels here 
is again the “logical multiplicity”—this time, the logical multiplicity of the action of teaching 
and learning language/calculus. 
Correspondingly, the action of the pupil, his getting command of language/calculus, can 
be seen as a way8 of performing (replicating) the action of the teacher—the demonstrated 
command of the language/calculus taught. 
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 In fact, Wittgenstein already spoke about the application of the propositional sign as the 
“method” of its application in the Tractatus (cf. § 3, [iv]). 
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(ix) Mind. In Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein held that the human mind 
(Geist) is only an instrumental concept—it is a way9 of doing something. Following Des-
cartes, we usually believe that the mind is a substance, but only because we think about the 
mind in physical terms. Concepts like “understanding”, “meaning”, etc., are thus typically 
interpreted as a kind of thin stuff. Wittgenstein’s main point now was that “where our lan-
guage [misleadingly] suggests a body [a stuff …] there is none: there, we should say, is a 
mind [Geist]” (1953, § 36). To be more exact, the concept of mind denotes nothing but the 
way9 in which we mentally do something: speak a language, calculate, etc. 
(x) Action. Wittgenstein had already discussed the problem of connecting language with 
action, including the action of operating with language (action of language producing and 
conceiving) in the Tractatus, wherein he claimed that “if a sign is useless [wird nicht ge-
braucht], it is meaningless” (3.328).13 Only in the Philosophical Investigations, however, he 
clearly articulated the doctrine that we can correctly use language only in terms of actions.  
The explicit change in Wittgenstein’s understanding can be tracked to the following re-
mark made in the “Theses” by Friedrich Waismann:  
 
  A propositional sign must have as many distinguishable elements as the corresponding situa-
tion. Both must have the same multiplicity. 
  A very good illustration of that is provided by taking the proposition of language as the in-
struction for doing something. By using words, I can, for instance, guide somebody around my 
room by saying, ‘Take three steps straight ahead! Now two to the left! Now stretch out your arm! 
Etc.’ Hence, it is evident that language must have the same multiplicity as those movements. 
(1930, 236)  
 
 In Philosophical Remarks, Wittgenstein claimed that language has the multiplicity of a 
signal box that produces actions that correspond to different sentences of that language (1964, 
§ 10). This idea held a central place in Philosophical Investigations, wherein Wittgenstein 
compared (in § 11) the different roles words play in our language with the different functions 
of the tools in a toolbox. Now, Wittgenstein maintained that an action, following an instruc-
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 The illustrious commentator of Wittgenstein’s philosophy, B. F. McGuinness, has correctly 
noticed that “we ought not to contrast the Tractatus, with its notion of Bedeutung, and the 
Philosophical Investigations, with its notion that naming is the use. Use determines reference 
in the Tractatus also” (1981, 66). 
 11 
 
tion (i.e. action that is not radically spontaneous and free), is nothing but a way10 of carrying 
out the instructions for acting. 
*** 
 It is time now to sum up the changes that Wittgenstein introduced in his conception of 
ways in the 1930s and 1940s. In these years, he concentrated his efforts on the different forms 
of connecting language/calculus action-instructions with language/calculus action-
acquisition. He also explored the problems of the relation between mind and action in gen-
eral. Importantly enough, in this second period of Wittgenstein’s philosophical development, 
his ontology remained non-reductionist and non-emergentist. The world of the lan-
guage/calculus instructor is not different in kind from the world of the instructed. They are 
just its different levels. The “bridge” (the “hinge”) between the two world levels is the logical 
multiplicity of the mental actions.  
 
6. Wittgenstein’s Ontology of Ways and the Naturalistic Metaphysics 
In this last section, we will demonstrate that Wittgenstein’s ontology of ways can help 
treat difficult philosophical problems of the emergence of mind, science, and nature. Its main 
advantage is that it dispenses with ontologies of different worlds of increasing complexity 
without elapsing into reductionism.  
(i) Technology. It is a common place that many technical devices employ the construc-
tive principle of ways. Here is a trivial example, well known for more than 150 years. The 
telephone transforms—in a certain way11—human speech into electrical impulses to transport 
them to another point in space. (The recorder transports them to another point in time.) In the 
next step, the electrical impulses are transformed again—following the same way11 but acti-
vated in reverse—into human speech. In the latter phase, electrical impulses construct an enti-
ty of a higher level (but not of a higher world): human speech. 
(ii) Philosophy of Biology. Similar considerations can be also adduced in the realm of 
the emergence of life. Life on Earth emerged as a result of the specific way12 in which some 
of its elements (chemical substances) were ordered. Standard theories of the origin of life, 
like that of Oparin–Haldane, can be interpreted in this sense. No final cause, no Aristotelian 
ἐντελέχια, no Kantian teleology, no Bergsonian élan vital, no vitalism in Hans Driesch’s 
sense, is needed for this purpose. 
(iii) Anthropology. Wittgenstein’s ontology of ways can also help explain how human 
beings emerged out of the animal world. A crowd of creationists claims that a convincing 
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answer to this question requires referring to God’s design. In contrast, the ontology of ways 
we have exposed and defended in the lines above supports the view that human form of life is 
only another way13 of arranging the building blocks of the basic forms of life of other spe-
cies—more so since, as we have already seen in § 3, (ii), (iii), and also in § 5, (x), language, 
thought, and action can be conceived of as ways of arranging lower levels of being.  
(iv)  Philosophy of Mind. Wittgenstein’s ontology of ways is especially effective in at-
tempting to solve the problem of how the mind relates to the brain. Thereby, it dispenses with 
all “occult processes” (1953, § 38) that are usually associated with this relation. In contrast, 
the “new mysterians”, Thomas Nagel and Colin McGinn, maintain that human reason cannot 
understand this relation in principle (cf. McGinn 1991)—or, as Emil du Bois-Reymond put it 
more than a century ago, ignoramus et ignorabimus.
14
  
In contrast, the consequential Wittgensteinians support the view that qualia depend onto-
logically on the ways14 in which the brain cells and the connections between them are or-
dered.
15
 Their opponents (cf. Davidson 1980, Putnam 1975), in contrast, maintain that even if 
two brains are identical, their psychological product will be different. In his theory of “neutral 
monism”, Donald Davidson, for example, claims that whereas mental events can be token-
identical with the physical events, they are not type-identical with them. In particular, propo-
sitional attitudes are not ontologically dependent on the brain.  
In fact, however, what Davidson’s argument really indicates is only that besides the brain 
events, a second physical factor interacts with the mental events: parts of the external world 
to which the mind is directed. In other words, mental events are ontologically dependent, in 
different proportions, both on the physical events of the brain, and on the events of the exter-
nal world. There is nothing intrinsically “anomalous” in this completely monistic conception 
of the relation between mind and matter. 
(v) Philosophy of Cosmology. Wittgenstein’s ontology of ways also shakes hands with 
the latest discoveries in cosmology. According to relativistic quantum theory, particles are to 
be understood as specific ways15 of arrangement of quantum fields. Certain arrangements of 
the fields (particularly their arrangement in our universe) correspond to the idea of 24 parti-
cles, and others to 276 particles.  
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 Arguments first formulated by Wittgenstein were successfully used against the  
ignorabimus principle in the philosophy of mind (cf. Bennett and Hacker 2013). 
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 Taking off from there, some authors (cf. Krauss 2012) conclude that the universe—the 
stuff of which is composed of 24 particles—is practically constructed from nothing. To be 
more exact, the stuff—the particles—are simply arrangements out of quantum fields. No en-
ergy is needed to this purpose. Correspondingly, the fact that “there is something [stuff, parti-
cles] rather than nothing” is only due to the specific way15 of arranging quantum fields. 
This conception was severely criticized by Albert (2012) with the argument that quantum 
fields are not “nothing”. Be this as it may, this point is irrelevant to our ontology of ways. 
What is important to it is that the external world can be seen as being composed of the specif-
ic ways15 in which the quantum fields are arranged. 
(vi) Style. While the early Wittgenstein was above all interested in the contemplative 
side of art—in the art consuming (cf. § 3, [vi])—the later Wittgenstein, who, as already seen, 
experienced an action-turn, paid more attention to art creating. Accordingly, in the mid-
1930s, Wittgenstein started maintaining that “style is the general necessity seen sub specie 
aeterninatis” (1997, 27).16 Of course, Wittgenstein meant here the style in works of art, not in 
science where it is of less importance. This claim is supported by the fact that in these lines 
Wittgenstein spoke about necessity “seen sub specie aeterninatis”—a term he used when he 
discussed works of art in the Tractatus (cf. § 3 [vi]) Indeed, since art is radically expressive, 
the style in it plays a key role. Propositions and theories of science and of everyday life are 
clearly different: they picture (model) parts of the world (states of affairs). That is why the 
style in them plays a minor role. 
The above-mentioned claim of Wittgenstein can be well interpreted in the sense of his 
ontology of ways. According to this interpretation, what Wittgenstein meant here was that 
style is constitutive by creating works of art: It is the “engine”17 by creating the work of art 
and the “rule” of its interpretation after it is produced. Most importantly, this rule can also be 
seen as the way15 in which the artefact is constructed (not just seen, as it was with way6). Dif-




7. Epilogue  
                                            
16
 See ch. 27. 
17
 We speak here about an “engine”—which is a physical object—only in a metaphorical 
sense. As we have seen, Wittgenstein strongly opposed using physical terms when speaking 
about the human mind. 
18
 See ch. 27 again. 
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 In the lines above we have seen that Wittgenstein suggested a sophisticated ontological 
model (method) that adequately explains the emergence of new levels of reality of increasing 
complexity. Over recent years, this topic has been extensively investigated using alternative 
methods (Clayton 2004; Deacon 2012; Kaufman 2000). We hope, however, that our study 
has shown that the approach we followed in it—the ontology of Wittgenstein’s ways—is 
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